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A SYMPOSIUM ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

SAFEGUARDING A CROWN JEWEL:
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
LAWYER CRITICISM OF COURTS*
Judith S. Kaye**
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is truly a privilege to participate in this lecture series honoring the
late Howard Lichtenstein, and I thank you for inviting me to address the
Hofstra Law community. Let me also express my appreciation to your
distinguished Lichtenstein Professor, Monroe H. Freedman. At this same
podium some seven years ago, Thomas Shaffer praised Professor
Freedman as a lawyer who makes the profession better simply by being
in it.' What an extraordinary tribute. It's so easy for just one lawyer, by
indifference and carelessness, to debase the entire profession, but
enormously difficult for just one lawyer--like Professor Freedman-by
a lifetime of dedicated, competent, ethical practice, to elevate it.

* The Howard Lichtenstein Legal Ethics Lecture, Nov. 6, 1996, Hofstra University School
of Law.
** Chief Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals. I am grateful to my law clerk James
A. Shifren for his superb assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. See Thomas L. Shaffer, InauguralHowardLichtenstein Lecture in Legal Ethics: Lawyer
Professionalismas a Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 393 (1990/91).
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This lecture series honors another such person, Howard Lichtenstein,
by wonderful coincidence a beloved partner in the New York City law
firm Proskauer Rose Goetz and Mendelsohn. To me, Proskauer is the
"in-law" firm-that's where my husband practices law, and where we
both came to know Howard as a gentle friend and a dynamite lawyer. By
force of prowess and personality, Howard could bring together the
fiercest adversaries in labor disputes; all of them, incredibly, extolling his
virtues. The former chairman of the Proskauer firm, Edward Silver,
having witnessed that feat innumerable times, summed up Howard as "a
lawyer who practiced law as it used to be."
This brings me to the substance of my remarks: how things are and
how things used to be in the legal profession. To provide a bit more
focus, from the universe of potential topics that might fit that bill I
discuss lawyer criticism of judges' decisions-a subject in which I have
more than a passing interest.
A.

A New Reality

To set the stage, I would like to touch briefly on a reality that is
vastly different from what some would call the more "gentlemanly,"
"civilized" days when Howard Lichtenstein first became a lawyer. I
might add that in my own youth in Monticello--still in the twentieth
century-attorneys were referred to as, for example, "Lawyer Weiss," a
title that bespoke the community's respect for the lawyers' role.
While there have obviously been many changes-not the least
among them the growth in our numbers, in law firm size, and in the
complexity of life generally 2-I put technology, specifically modem
communications, right at the top of the list of what is dramatically
different today. And I do not just mean the astounding capacity to fax
documents to Singapore from the back of a New York City taxicab, or
talk on the telephone while crossing Forty-Second Street to an airline
passenger several miles overhead. I mean, as well, another kind of

2. Predictions are that by the end of the century, the number of lawyers will reach the one
million mark. In 1929, when Howard Lichtenstein was admitted to the bar, there were approximately
161,000 lawyers nationwide-approximately the number of New York attorneys today. See BUREAU
OF THE CENsus, HISToRIcAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, at 75
(1960). With the growth in numbers has come an explosion in what lawyers do: they are presidents,
governors, mayors, politicians of every stripe; they are CEOs and CFOs; they are novelists and pundits; they litigate, legislate, mediate, educate, and negotiate on a heroic scale all across the nation.
Indeed, the range is so great that it is no longer possible to define comprehensively what it is that
lawyers do.
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power-the unparalleled power of the media, and the use of the media,
to shape public opinion.
Modem technology has shrunk the world and put it into everyone's
living room. Suddenly, we can immediately know everything, delivered
byte-by-byte or (most people's menu preference) already chewed and
digested in prepackaged snappy soundbites. Can there be a better
example than the infamous O.. Simpson trial? Instant education in all
of the intricacies of the law; instant "thumbs down" to the entire justice
system.3
Then too, the ability to "spin" masses of information and manipulate
public opinion is staggering. There is no time, or taste, for anything more
than someone else's quick label, usually written in indelible ink that is
impossible to eradicate. Responses (unless offered in kind) invariably
seem "defensive" and are back-bumered, if noticed at all.
B. A Reality That Has Endured
To be sure, not all of the realities have changed. Many seem to have
endured. I know, for example, that for as long as there have been judges,
there have been lawyers critical of their decisions, often very vocally.
Discontent is a natural part of the litigation process, which usually leaves
one side unhappy. At the same time, there has always been widespread
recognition in this country that a cornerstone of a peaceful, orderly
society is respect for law and respect for the dignity of the judicial
process.4
Through the ages, legal luminaries have wrung their hands over the
proper balance between the fundamental value of respect for the law and
the fundamental right of citizens--even lawyer-citizens--to have their go

3. During the OJ. Simpson trial, a poll (pre-verdict) commissioned by the ABA Journal
showed that news coverage of the trial caused twenty-eight percent of those questioned to have less

respect for the criminal justice system and twenty-five percent to have less respect for lawyers. See
Don J. DeBenedictis, The National Verdict, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 52, 53. In what might be viewed

as poetic justice, but which offers only cold comfort, the survey of 1,011 adults also found that fiftysix percent had less respect for the media. See id; see also Lincoln Caplan, Why Play-by-Play
CoverageStrikes OutforLawyers, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 62, 63 (noting that narrow legal coverage
offers "information delivered without knowledge, escorted by opinion without explanation, and
soothsaying without heed of consequences"). But e f Nadine Strossen, Free Press and Fair Trial:

Implications of the O.J. Simpson Case, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 647, 654 (arguing that televised megatrials make "an enormous, invaluable contribution to [the] pubic['s] understanding").
4. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 242-48 (J.P. Mayer & Max

Lemer eds. & George Lawrence trans., 1st ed. 1966) (noting the strong respect for law that animates
American political culture and radiates across all economic classes).
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at courts and judges.5 By the same token, we have long struggled with
the question of the appropriate response for judges who find themselves
the targets of such criticism.
The debate is not new, but its parameters have recently been
radically rewritten. If there was a struggle to strike the right balance in
the kinder, gentler day of "Lawyer Weiss" and young Howard
Lichtenstein-a day before boom boxes, stereophonic sound, and remote
control--just imagine the enormity of the challenge today, when a
politician can seize the entire front page of a tabloid or a spot on the
evening news with a soundbite slap at a judge who cannot bite back.
In joining the dialogue on this critical issue, I would like to begin
by first revisiting principles: what is this debate all about and why is it
so important? I then plan to touch on the guiding ethics principles.
Finally, I will conclude with a couple of suggestions for ameliorating a
situation today that is at least undesirable and perhaps even dangerous.6
II.

INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY

Without being unduly provincial, it is safe to say that the recent
nationwide assault on the judiciary-rarely front-page fodder-began
right here in New York.
As the calendar changed from 1995 to 1996, so did the climate for

5. In 1830, for example, impeachment proceedings were spearheaded by then-House Judiciary
Committee Chairman (later, President) James Buchanan against a federal judge, James H. Peck of
the District of Missouri, for his efforts at silencing attorney criticism. Judge Peck had held an
attorney in contempt and disbarred and imprisoned him based on the lawyer's anonymous newspaper
article criticizing one of the judge's decisions. See ARTHUR J. STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL

OF JAMES H. PECK (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). Although the impeachment failed by a onevote margin, the proceedings prodded Congress to enact the federal contempt statute, see Act of Mar.
2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487, and have long demarked important principles of First Amendment
jurisprudence. See Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 406 (1956) (discussing impeachment
proceedings against James H. Peck); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33,45 (1941) (discussing public
concern of Judge Peck's opinion). Also consider In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959), in which
conflicting visions of the First Amendment's proper scope are embodied. Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion concluded that attorney criticism of the judiciary should not be proscribed unless the
statement directly "tend[s] to obstruct the administration of justice." Id. at 636. On the other hand,
Justice Frankfurter's dissent held out the notion that an attorney is an officer of the court who must
abide by higher standards of conduct. See id. at 668.
6. I want to be clear at the outset that I do not have in mind the innumerable excellent
educational activities of judges and lawyers: teaching as well as learning. See, e.g., Talbot
D'Alemberte, Searchingfor the Limits of Judicial Free Speech, 61 TUL. L. REV. 611 (1987);
Stephen Reinhardt, JudicialSpeech and the Open Judiciary,28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 805 (1995); Jack
B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges' Learning, Speaking, and Acting: Part N Speaking and PartIII
Acting, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (1994). My observations are largely directed at nonacademic public
criticisms of particular rulings.
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the courts, which every day became headline news. A confluence of four
events relating to crime-far and away the number one "hot button"
issue-proved a wicked combination for judges: first, the New York
Governor's criminal justice package, announced concomitantly with an
attack on the Court of Appeals; 7 second, Judge Lorin Duckman's bail
decision in a domestic violence case that ended in two deaths;8 third,
promotion of Judge Harold Rothwax's book tantalizingly titled Guilty:
The Collapse of Criminal Justice;9 and finally, Judge Harold Baer's
suppression of eighty pounds of heroin and cocaine in the trial of a drug
courier."0 For judges, it was a chill winter, barely thawing in the spring,
with the media and public officials vying for the most cutting criticisms." "Mindless," "idiotic," and "junk justice" likely top the list.
After the Baer decision, White House Press Secretary Michael
McCurry put "a Federal judge on public notice today that if he did not
reverse a widely criticized decision throwing out drug evidence, the
President might ask for his resignation."' 2 Then-Senate Majority Leader

7. See S. 219-6041, 2d Legis. Sess. § 2 (N.Y. 1996) (proposed Police and Public Protection
Act of 1996 to amend N.Y. CRM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 1992)). Governor Pataki sought,
among other things, to limit New York's exclusionary rule (article 1, section 12 of the state
constitution, the analog to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution) to bad-faith violations
which were "not in whole or in part [committed] for the purpose of protecting the safety of the
[police officer] or another person." Memorandum from the Office of the Governor of New York to
the New York State Legislature 2 (1996) (Governor's Program Bill No. 64) (on file with the Hofstra
Law Review).
Before the press conference announcing the proposed legislation, a two-page spread on the
New York Court of Appeals appeared in New York City's DailyNews, highlighting several decisions
going back a decade or more and characterizing the court as "all too ready to toss out criminal
convictions:' Paul Schwartzman, Sitting in Judgment: Highest State Court on Trial, DAILY NEws
(New York City), Jan. 28, 1996, at 6; see also George Pataki,Evidence Shows CourtMust Change,
DAILY NEws (New York City), Feb. 7, 1996, at 31 ("Mo win [the] war [on crime], police officers
must be free from the yoke of complex [evidentiary] rules that endanger their lives and prevent them
from doing their jobs.").
8. See, e.g., Alice McQuillan et al., He Was Freedto Kill: Judge Released ObsessedStalker,
DAILY NEws (New York City), Feb. 14, 1996, at 4.
9. HAROLD . RoTmwAx, GuILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRTMNAL JUSTICE (1996).
10. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). After granting reargument
and hearing additional testimony from the police and the defendant, Judge Baer reversed his
suppression order. See United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
11. See, e.g., Maureen Fan et al., Gov EyesImpeachment: PatakiRips Judge Who FreedKiller,
DAILY NEWS (New York City), Feb. 16, 1996, at 7 (attacking the Duckman bail decision); The
Governor'sAttack on the Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1996, at A22 (discussing Governor Pataki's
promotion of his Police and Public Protection Act); Clyde Haberman, State Courts Found Guilty by
Jury of Peers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at B I (describing panel discussion of Rothwax's book).
12. Alison Mitchell, Clinton PressingJudge to Relent: PresidentWants a Reversal of Drug
Evidence Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at Al.
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Robert Dole added that if Judge Baer did not resign '[h]e ought to be
impeached."",13 Months later, in a speech applauded in the opinion polls,
Senator Dole declared that ."[t]he single most important thing a President
can do to fight crime is put crime fighters in our courtrooms-both on
' 14
the bench and at the prosecutor's desk.'
Lawyer committees formed 15 and declarations of judicial independence abounded.
In a letter to Judge Baer, Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, wrote:
'We greatly regret that this case has become a topic of political debate
and that there has been so much inappropriate rhetoric surrounding
it.... The independence of the judiciary is obviously one of the
fundamental cornerstones of our government and democracy. It is
indeed that independence that both the Government and defendants rely
6
upon in every case for a fair and just decision on the merits.'
Second Circuit Chief Judge Jon 0. Newman, together with three
senior judges, Judge J. Edward Lumbard, Judge Wilfred Feinberg, and
Judge James L. Oakes, issued a unique joint statement warning that
"'[a]ttacks on a judge risk inhibition of all judges as they conscientiously
endeavor to discharge their constitutional responsibilities.""..7 And Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist reminded a Washington audience that
judicial independence is ".one of the crown jewels of our system of
government." 18
A.

What Judicial Independence Is

That crown jewel, of course,
government since this nation's
persuading New York to ratify the
no liberty, if the power of judging

has been a centerpiece of American
founding. Alexander Hamilton, in
Constitution, explained that "there is
be not separated from the legislative

13. Katharine Q. Seelye, A Get-Tough Message at California'sDeath Row, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
24, 1996, § 1, at 29.
14. Katharine Q. Seelye, Revisiting the Issue of Crime Dole Offers List of Remedies, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 29, 1996, at Al.
15. See Daniel Wise, 26BarGroupsJoin to Defend Judiciary: 'Intemperate,Personal'Attacks
Criticized,N.Y. LJ., Mar. 8, 1996, at 1.
16. Louis H. Pollak, CriticizingJudges, 79 JUDICATURE 299, 301 (1996).
17. Don Van Natta, Jr., JudgesDefend a Colleaguefrom Attacs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1996,
atBi.
18. Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Joins Frayon Rulings, Defending JudicialIndependence,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al.
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and executive powers .... The complete independence of the courts of
justice is... essential ... ."" And on the floor of the House of

Representatives nearly 200 years ago, John Rutledge, Jr. admonished his
colleagues:
The Government may be administered with indiscretion and with
violence; offices may be bestowed exclusively upon those who have no
other merit than that of carrying votes at elections; the commerce of
our country may be depressed by nonsensical theories, and public credit
may suffer from bad intentions; but, so long as we may have an
independent Judiciary, the great interests of the people will be
safe.... Leave to the people an independent Judiciary, and they will
prove that man is capable of governing himself; they will be saved
from what has been the fate of all other Republics, and they will
disprove20 the position that Governments of a Republican form cannot
endure.
Much more recently, John Feerick, Dean of Fordham Law School,
in a magnificent address on the subject, noted that "[a] judge is not there

to implement a political agenda of a president, legislator, governor, or
mayor, for that would be to corrupt the judiciary and to substitute
political will for the rule of law."'
Indeed, many landmarks of American history give life to those
words. I think, for instance, of the extraordinary courage displayed by
federal judges of the South issuing antisegregation orders during the early
days of the civil rights struggle. 22 I think of the role of Judge John

19. THE FEDERAuST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). Without
judicial independence, Hamilton argued, "all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would
amount to nothing." Id.
20. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 739-40 (1802). Judicial independence, of course, consists of
"institutional" independence as well as "adjudicatory" independence. See Martin H. Redish, Federal
JudicialIndependence: Constitutional and PoliticalPerspectives, 46 MERCER L. REv. 697, 699
(1995). The judiciary's institutional independence in New York is embodied, in part, in the
constitution's vesting of responsibility for the administration and operation of the state's courts in
the chiefjudge. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 28. In the federal system, such institutional independence
is guaranteed by the salary and tenure protections provided by Article mI of the U.S. Constitution.
21. John D. Feerick, Leslie H. Arps Memorial Lecture, Judicial Independence and the
ImpartialAdministrationofJustice, 51 RECORD 233, 239 (Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York
1996). Nelson Mandela recently exemplified this point. Although the Constitutional Court of South
Africa rejected the country's proposed new constitution, a cause that Mandela had championed, he
accepted the court's judgment without challenge and stood ready to satisfy the court's objections.
See Suzanne Daley, New South Africa ConstitutionIs Rejected by the High Court,N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
7, 1996, at A7.
22. See generally J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EiGHT LONELY MEN: SoUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES
AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1971) (illustrating the social, political, and personal pressures faced
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Sirica, a longtime staunch Republican, in forcing out the truth in
the Watergate case, ultimately toppling the Nixon Administration.' To
be contrasted against these examples are the Third Reich judges
of yesterday24 and some Peruvian judges of today2L-puppets of a
political regime-reminding us just how prized that crown jewel should
be.

I think not only of the strength but also of the fragility of judicial
independence.

26
The "least dangerous branch," as Hamilton called the judiciary,

has frequently been the target of efforts to weaken its standing. Proposals
have been made for the recall of judges, shortened terms, and court-

packing.27 But perhaps most threatening of all are unfounded frontal
assaults on the courts themselves. People respect the law and are willing

to live by the law, only as long as they believe that it operates fairly and
effectively. Therefore, unfounded attacks on the courts exact a high price.
As a federal court of appeals judge warned in his letter of resignation
from the bench (where he, unlike New York State judges, enjoyed
lifetime tenure), "'[t]he current tactics will affect the independence of the

by federal judges subsequent to the Supreme Court's decisions to desegregate public schools).
23. See James Zagel & Adam.Winkler, The Independence ofJudges,46 MERCER L. REv. 795,
823 (1995). Sirica's actions proved Hamilton's words true: "The independence of the judges
is ...requisite to guard the constitution and the rights of individuals from... those ill humours
which the arts of designing men... sometimes disseminate among the people ... and
which... occasion dangerous innovations in the government." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note
19, at 472.
24. See INGO MOLLER, HrLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE TIRD REICH (Deborah Lucas

Schneider trans., 1991).
25. See Lynn F. Monahan, Peru May Free Many Who Deny Terrorist Ties, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
20, 1996, at A24; see also Weinstein, supra note 6,at 2-4 (describing how the Peruvian President's
replacement of most of the country's judges with temporary judges violated the principle ofjudicial
independence).
26. Tm FEDERAuST NO. 78, supranote 19, at 468 (stating that "the judiciary, from the nature
of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution"). See
generallyALEXANER,
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE

BAR OF PoLmCs (2d ed. 1986) (making the phrase, "the least dangerous branch," famous as a
symbol for his theory of judicial restraint).
27. See Irving R. Kaufman, ChillingJudicialIndependence,88 YALE L.J.681,690-715 (1979).
In addition to Franklin D. Roosevelt's attempt to "pack the bench" that had impeded the progress
of his New Deal legislation, there have also been significant efforts to limit the Court's appellate
jurisdiction. For example, during Reconstruction, northern radicals sought to shrink the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction, an episode memorialized in ExparteMcCardle,74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
See Kaufrnan,supra, at 690 & n.60 (citing 1 CHARLES FAIMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION,
1864-88, at 433-514 (1971)).
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judiciary and the public's confidence in it, without which [the judiciary]
cannot survive."' 28
B.

What Judicial Independence Is Not

There are many eloquent expressions of what judicial independence
is, but I think it equally as important to note what it is not.
Judicial independence does not mean the judicial branch is sealed
off from the legislative and executive branches. Indeed, the judiciary is
vitally linked to its partners in government in many ways, not the least
of which is funding. Nor does independence mean that the judiciary is
immune from criticism or full accountability to the public
which it
serves. Quite the contrary, the courthouses and the business conducted
within them are wide open for public viewing and comment.
While the judiciary, as part of government, is fully accountable to
the public, in this respect there are crucial differences between the
judiciary and the other two "politicar' branches of government. One
crucial difference is that those public officials are supposed to be
responsive to the popular will. Judges are not. Judges are not part of the
executive branch. They are not "'on the team with the police to catch
criminals."' 2 9 They are not "'crime fighters."' 3 ° Instead, their sworn
duty is to impartially apply the law, which may at times be
countermajoritarian; it may at times not be to their liking; it may at times
not even make "common sense" to them personally.
A second crucial difference is that to secure an impartial forum,
even for their most vocal critics, and to assure the dignity of the judicial
process, judges by and large must stay out of the fray. They do not duel
with public officials about the correctness of their decisions; they do not

28. William J. Pinilis, Lawyer-PoliticiansShould Be Sanctionedfor JeeringJudges, NJ. LJ.,
July 1, 1996, at 29, 38 (alterations in original) (quoting Judge H. Lee Sarokin's letter announcing
his resignation from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit). Observers of the "current tactics"
have noted with trepidation that "[w]hile political attacks on the federal judiciary have drawn the
most national attention during recent election campaigns, state court judges may be most at risk."

John Gibeaut, TakingAim, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 50, 52. For example, former Tennessee Supreme
Court Justice Penny White was targeted in a retention vote, which she eventually lost. Her re-

election was jeopardized because of joining,not writing, a decision in a capital case that affirmed
a defendant's conviction, but remanded the case for the limited purpose of a new sentencing hearing.

Ironically, all five justices agreed there was an error in sentencing. See Ud. at 53 (discussing the
court's opinion in State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996)).
29. James Dao, Pataki Gains Pick as Court Loses Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1996, at B28

(quoting Judge Richard D. Simons upon his retirement from the Court of Appeals ofNew York).
30. Seelye, supra note 14, at Al (quoting a presidential campaign speech made by former
Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole (R-Kan.)).
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conduct press conferences about cases; and they have no call-in radio and
television programs to explain their rulings.31 They rely on their
decisions, whether written or oral, to speak for themselves.
This is not simply a matter of choice. Rather, it is a matter of
prohibition.32 The Model Code of Judicial Conduct bars judges from
making statements that detract from the dignity of office,33 commenting
publicly on the merits of a pending or impending action,34 or making

31. In fact, where that option has been considered it has been rejected. For example, a South
Carolina ethics opinion decided that Canon 2 of its Code of Judicial Conduct prohibited a judge
from answering questions on a radio talk show. The committee concluded that the judge's regular
appearance would improperly lend the prestige of his office to the radio station, and added that
the spontaneous interchange between the judge and the call-in listener could well affect
the dignity of the judge, his office and interfere with his performance of his judicial
office, as well as having [a] negative impact on the dignity of other members of the
judiciary and the effectiveness of their performance of their judicial duties.
South Carolina Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. No. 14-1991 (1991); see
also In re Broadbelt, 683 A.2d 543 (NJ. 1996) (offering an excellent compendium of relevant
principles in this area), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1251 (1997).
32. The American Bar Association ("ABA") first adopted a Canon of Judicial Ethics in 1924.
The impetus for the Canons was apparently the refusal of United States District Court Judge
Kennesaw Mountain Landis, Major League Baseball's first commissioner, to resign from the court
while overseeing America's pastime. Landis remained on the court, earning $7,500 as judge and
$42,500 as baseball czar. His activities prompted the ABA, at its 1921 convention, to pass a
resolution of censure and appoint a committee to propose standards ofjudicial ethics. See STEPHEN
GILLERs & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATuES AND STANDARDS 549 (1997);

JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 180-82 (1974). The 1924 Canons, drafted by
a committee headed by Chief Justice William Howard Taft, consisted of 36 Canons in all and were
a mixture of generalized admonitions and specific rules of proscribed conduct. With occasional
amendment, they served the profession for nearly 50 years and were adopted by most states. See
GELLERS & SIMON, supra, at 549.

In 1969, however, in response to the perceived flaws in the original Canons, the ABA
created a Special Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct. The committee, chaired by California
Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor, was charged with developing a modem code of ethics. And
in 1972, the ABA formally adopted the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See id. Nearly all the states
have adopted Codes of Judicial Conduct closely modeled after the ABA Code. See JEFFREY M.
SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICALm CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.02 (1990).

33. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 2A, 5A (1972).
34. See id. Canon 3A(6). In a recent decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a
judge's regular appearances on television to comment on cases pending in otherjurisdictions violated
its version of this Canon, as well as Canon 2B. See Broadbelt, 683 A.2d at 548-51.
In 1990, the ABA proposed a revision to the Model Code. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra
note 32, at 549-50. The 1990 Model Code ofJudicial Conduct modified the proscription against such
comment from prohibiting judicial comment while a proceeding is pending or impending in any
court, to prohibiting ajudge from "mak[ing] any public comment that might reasonably be expected
to affect its outcome [of the proceeding] or impair its faimess." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3B(9) (1990). The language of New Jersey's Canon at issue in Broadbelt is identical to the
language ofthe 1972 Code. As ofspring 1994, 20jurisdictions had adopted Codes or Canons wholly
or partly based on the 1990 Code. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 32, at 550; SHAMAN ET AL.,
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any statements that cast doubt on their impartiality. 3 Further, judges
must disqualify themselves when their impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.36 For New York State judges, those same proscriptions are
contained in the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts" which,
like the Code, prohibits judges from commenting on any cases in the
judicial pipeline, even cases in other jurisdictions. 5
Although there is technically no rule forbidding a judge's public
statements about a current completed case,39 and considering that even
judges have First Amendment rights, 0 such statements are generally
viewed as "an unwise course."' In a legal system where stare decisis

plays such an important role, today's completed case-particularly a case

supra note 32, § 16.01 (Supp. 1994). As of January 1996, certain provisions of New York State's
Rules Governing Judicial Conduct were amended based on the 1990 Model Code. The proscription
against comment on pending and impending cases was not one of these. See generally Marjorie E.
Gross, Updated Rules on JudicialConduct, N.Y. L..,May 14, 1996, at 1 (outlining the changes in
the New York Rules).
35. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A (1972).
36. See id. Canon 3C(l).
37. See N.Y. COmp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 100.0-100.6 (Supp. 1996).
38. See i § 100.3(B)(8); see also New York Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 93-133
(1994) (interpreting rule to prohibit a judge's television commentary on cases pending in other
jurisdictions).
39. See, e.g., Broadbelt,683 A.2d at 546 (citing Wenger v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance,
630 P.2d 954, 965 (Cal. 1981) (en bane); Goldman v. Nevada Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 830
P.2d 107, 136-37 (Nev. 1992)).
40. See In re Rome, 542 P.2d 676, 684 (Kan. 1975) (stating that a judge does not relinquish
his or her First Amendment rights on ascending to bench); D'Alemberte, supranote 6, at 630 (noting
that any standard limiting a judge's capacity to speak impartially is subjective, and therefore
troublesome in the context of free speech).
However, limitations may be placed on a judge's First Amendment rights. See Scott v.
Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 212 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Mhe state may restrict the speech of electedjudges
in ways that it may not restrict the speech of other elected officials."); Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F.
Supp. 1225, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that a 'Judge's constitutional right to say what he
pleases from the bench is not without limits"). Commentators have advocated that courts apply an
intermediate level of scrutiny to regulations that impose limitations on judicial speech. See e.g.,
Erwin Chemerinsky, Is It the Siren's Call?: Judges and Free Speech While CasesAre Pending,28
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 831, 842-43 (1995).
41. See, e.g., New York Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 92-13 (1992) (stating that
it is better for a judge not to respond to a letter to the editor criticizing a judge's ruling); see also
In re Benoit, 523 A.2d 1381, 1382-83 (Me. 1987) (holding that it is inappropriate for a judge, after
cases were remanded, to write a letter to the editor of a local newspaper defending his original
sentences); Broadbelt, 683 A.2d at 548 (holding that a judge's regular appearance on commercial
television to discuss pending cases in other jurisdictions had potential to compromise the integrity
and independence of the New Jersey judiciary).
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significant enough to command public attention-is, after all, the grist for
tomorrow's docket.
Interestingly, while judges are bound to silence when facing their
critics about particular cases, that was not always so.42 When M'Culloch
v. Maryland 3 was pilloried in the press, Chief Justice John Marshall
himself apparently published not one, but two, rebuttals, the second
under the pseudonym "A Friend of the Union." 44 More recently, a
young Washington reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal,assigned
to cover a Supreme Court opinion written by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, simply rang the Judge's doorbell to get the story.45 Holmes
was entertaining guests at tea and, at first, asked the reporter to return
later; however, he changed his mind, invited the reporter upstairs, and
spent an hour going over the opinion, "'literally dictating much of the
article in newspaper language. It ran.., a couple of columns in the

42. In fact, the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics, while providing that judges should be
"impartial" (Canon 5), "independent" (Canon 14), free of "political bias" (Canon 28), and 'Tearless
of public clamor" (Canon 34), contain no proscription against commenting on pending or impending
cases. See CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924).
According to commentators and chief participants, a tension arose in drafting the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct during the late 1960s and early 1970s between the philosophies of Dean
Acheson, who wanted to prohibit judges from engaging in all but the most narrowly defined "legal"
activities, and Judge Irving R. Kaufman, who argued that the Code should encourage, rather than
discourage, judicial activities that exceed the four comers of cases in the courtroom. See Dean
Acheson, Removing the Shadow Cast on the Courts, 55 A.B.A. J. 919, passim (1969); Irving R.
Kaufiaan, Lions orJackals: The Function ofa Code ofJudicialEthics,35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
3, 5 (1970). In the compromise between these two positions, the 1972 Model Code of Judicial
Conduct was bom. See generally D'Alemberte, supra note 6, at 629-30 (discussing Canons 4 and
5 of the Model Code, which deal with restrictions on a judge's legal, quasi-legal, and non-legal
activities).
43. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
44. See Fred N. Six, A Request for Thoughtful Criticism, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 655, 662-63
(1993). On March 24, 1819, Marshall wrote to Justice Story:
"Our opinion in the Bank case has aroused the sleeping spirit of Virginia, if indeed it
ever sleeps. It will, I understand, be attacked in the papers with some asperity, and as
those who favor it never write for the publick [sic], it will remain undefended and of
course be considered as damnably heretical."
Id. (quoting I CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNI
STATES HISTORY, 1789-1835,
at 515 (1926)). One month later, Marshall published his second piece in the PhiladelphiaUnion. See
id; see also Gerald Gunther, John Marshall, "A Friend of the Constitution": In Defense and
Elaboration of McCulloch v. Maryland, 21 STAN. L. REV. 449, 449-55 (1969) (discussing the
newspaper battle of the pseudonyms between Marshall and Spencer Roane, a prominent Virginia
judge).
45. See Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court'sStory: Justice andJournalism at the Supreme
Court, 105 YALE LJ. 1537, 1559-60 (1996).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss3/1

12

Kaye: Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial Independence and Lawyer Crit
19971

SAFEGUARDING JUDICLIL INDEPENDENCE

Courier-Journal
and was esteemed as a clear and intelligible newspaper
46
story."'
What different times we live in! I cannot imagine doing that today:
neither being asked, nor being allowed, a full hour of time by a journalist
to discuss a case, nor controlling the interview as well as the article, nor
taking it upon myself to expound upon an opinion joined in by several
of my colleagues. But then again, I'm no Holmes.
I will leave for another day the question of why there has been this
shift from following every human being's instinct to respond, enlighten,
persuade, and punch out the critics to, instead, seeking saintly ground in
silence. Whatever its causes, whether wisdom, inexperience, terror, or
something else, the fact is that judges today cannot and do not answer
back, but hold up the banners of judicial dignity, judicial impartiality and
judicial independence, and look to the bar to hold up the other end of
those banners. The prevailing view is that a judge's defenses are "best
left to the objectivity of a local, county or state bar association."47
And that brings me to my next subject, the rightful defenders of the
crown jewel: lawyers.

III. THE LAWYERS' ROLE
Lawyers are by definition "officers of the court."48 Lawyers are
part and parcel of the legal system; they depend on, and in turn are

depended on for, the effective administration of justice. Most importantly, they, like judges, speak and understand the language of the law. That

language is often (perhaps too often) incomprehensible to anyone else.
It needs translators.

46. Id. at 1560 (quoting Letter from George Garner to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (Jan.
13, 1932) (on file with the Harvard Law Library)); see also D'Alemberte, supra note 6, at 620-27
(providing a long and wide-ranging list of judges' speeches and activities outside the courtroom,
beginning with the activities of John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who served
as counselor to President Washington and Ambassador to England while on the bench).
47. New York Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 92-13 (Jan. 30, 1992). One
distinguished commentator observed the following:
In order to preserve the appearance of impartiality, judges normally follow the wise
tradition of refusing to be drawn into public controversies about their actions. That
judicial tradition leaves judges unable to defend themselves against groundless public
charges. For such protection judges have traditionally relied upon lawyers, their' col-

leagues for that occasion at least.
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 11.3, at 601 (1986).
48. See, e.g., Mark R. Killenbeck, Professionalismin the Balance?, 49 ARK. L. REV. 671,674
(1997); Ronald D. Rotunda, Dealing with the Media: Ethical, Constitutional and Practical
Parameters,84 ILL. BJ. 614, 617 (1996).
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It is therefore not surprising that from earliest times lawyers have
had, in addition to special privileges, special responsibilities to the courts.
The distinguished lawyer and judge, George Sharswood, a founder of
American legal ethics,4 9 explained:
Fidelity to the court requires outward respect in words and
actions .. . There are occasions, no doubt; when duty to the interests
confided to the charge of the advocate demands firm and decided
opposition to the views expressed or the course pursued by the court,
nay, even manly and open remonstrance; but this duty may be faithfully
performed, and yet that outward respect be preserved, which is
here inculcated. Counsel should ever remember how necessary it is
for the dignified and honorable administration of justice, upon which
the dignity and honor of their profession entirely depend, that
the courts and the members of the courts, should be regarded with
respect ....'0
A.

The Rules on Paper

The very first formal Canons of Professional Ethics, drafted almost
ninety years ago, embodied these sentiments, beginning with the principle
that
[i]n America, where the stability of Courts and of all departments of
government rests upon the approval of the people, it is peculiarly
essential that the system for establishing and dispensing Justice
be... so maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of its administration.,

To this day, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which
essentially governs New York lawyers,52 charges lawyers with an

49. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The FutureofLegalEthics, 100 YALE LJ.1239, 1249 (1991).

From his chair of law at the University of Pennsylvania, Sharswood delivered a series of highly
influential lectures on the "Aims and Duties of the Profession of the Law," which were eventually
published and widely circulated. They had a profound influence on the first formal codes of ethics.
See Robert MacCrate, "The Lost Lawyer" Regained: The Abiding Values of the Legal Profession,
100 DIcK. L. REv. 587, 593 (1996).
50. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL EThics 61-62 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 5th ed. 1993)
(1854).
51. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETMCS Preamble (1936).
52. '"he Code of Professional Responsibility, as promulgated by the American Bar Association

...was adopted by the New York State Bar Association as its own code of ethics, effective January
1,1970, with certain amendments .... ."N.Y. JUn. LAW Appendix (McKinney 1992). The four New
York Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court adopted as joint rules the Disciplinary Rules of the
Code, with amendments, effective September 1, 1990. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22,
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obligation both to "assist in improving the legal system" and to promote
public confidence in it.53 The Code encourages attorneys to "protest
earnestly against the... election of those who are unsuited for the
bench,"' but recognizes that "[a]djudicatory officials, not being wholly
free to defend themselves, are entitled to receive the support of the bar
against unjust criticism."5
According to the Code, "'[c]onfidence in our law, our courts, and
in the administration of justice is our supreme interest."' 56 Furthermore,
[w]hile a lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize [judges] publicly,
[the lawyer] should be certain of the merit of his [or her] complaint,
use appropriate language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained
and intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence in our legal
system. Criticisms motivated by reasons other than a desire to improve
the legal system are not justified.57

Apart from these statements of aspiration, under the Code, a lawyer
is actually subject to discipline for "conduct that is prejudicial to the

administration of justice,"58 for "conduct that adversely reflects on his
' and for "knowingly mak[ing] false accusations
fitness to practice law,"59

against a judge or other adjudicatory officer."6
Much to the same effect, though somewhat more limited, the

American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (now
in effect in forty states as well as the District of Columbia,61 but not

§ 1200 (Supp. 1996).
53. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon
54. Id. EC 8-6.

8 (1980).

55. Id.
56. Id. EC 9-1 n.1 (quoting Erwin M. Jennings Co. v. DiGenova, 141 A. 866, 868 (Conn.
1928)). The Code further provides as follows: "Continuation of the American concept that we are
to be governed by rules of law requires that the people have faith that justice can be obtained
through our legal system. A lawyer should promote public confidence in our system and in the legal
profession." Id. EC 9-1 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. EC 8-6 (footnotes omitted). "'[E]very lawyer, worthy of respect, realizes that public
confidence in our courts is the cornerstone of our governmental structure, and will refrain from
unjustified attack on the character of the judges, while recognizing the duty to denounce and expose
a corrupt or dishonest judge."' Id. EC 8-6 n.10 (quoting Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Lewis, 282
S.W.2d 321, 326 (Ky. 1955)).
58. Id. DR 1-102(A)(5); see also N.Y. CONw. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.3(a)(5) (Supp.
1996) (adopting the same language).
59. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6); see also N.Y. COw?.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.3(a)(8) (adopting the same language).
60. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 8-102(B); see also N.Y. CON?.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.43(b) (adopting the same language).
61. See GILLERS & SmION, supra note 32, at 3.
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New York) declare that a "lawyer should demonstrate respect for the
legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers
and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to
challenge the rectitude62 of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to
uphold legal process."
Specifically, the Model Rules direct:
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be
false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the
qualifications or integrity of ajudge, adjudicatory officer or public legal
officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal
office. 63
As explained in the comment, "[t]o maintain the fair and independent
administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional
efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized."6' Another rule
provides that "[ilt is professional misconduct for a lawyer to...
engage
' 65
justice."
of
administration
the
to
prejudicial
is
that
in conduct
In sum, the ethics rules that govern lawyers direct that they should
help maintain the fair and impartial administration of justice, promote
public confidence in the courts, support and defend the judiciary against
unjust criticism, and refrain from making knowingly false statements
about judges. Except for the last provision-prohibiting knowingly false
statements-these loose standards obviously leave wide room for
interpretation and misinterpretation.
B.

The Rules in Application

And how are the rules actually applied? The paucity of published
decisions is itself significant. Despite a long tradition of outspoken
criticism by the bar, there are in fact relatively few proceedings that
address this matter.
To be sure, several state courts have interpreted the rules to confine
the expression of opinions that diminish public confidence, not merely
knowingly false statements of fact. 6 The Supreme Court of South

62. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Preamble (1992).

63. Id. Rule 8.2(a).
64. Id. Rule 8.2 cmt.
65. Id. Rule 8.4(d).
66. See, e.g., In re Riley, 691 P.2d 695, 706 (Ariz. 1984) (in bane) (sanctioning a judicial
candidate for mischaracterization of an incumbent opponent); In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Ind.
1979) (stating that unwarranted criticism does nothing but weaken and erode the public's confidence

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss3/1

16

Kaye: Safeguarding a Crown Jewel: Judicial Independence and Lawyer Crit
SAFEGUARDING JUDICILINDEPENDENCE

19971

Dakota, for example, censured a lawyer for telling a local weekly

newspaper that "'[t]he state courts were incompetent and sometimes
downright crooked, Judge Adams excepted."' 67 The court found the

attorney "voice[d] his complaints in precisely the manner and forum that
would most likely cast doubt upon the competence and integrity of the
members of the judiciary without the slightest possibility that any

constructive, remedial actions would result from those remarks."6
Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court reprimanded a district attorney
for a television interview criticizing the court's reversal of the death
penalty in a high publicity case as "'the most shocking and outrageous

decision in the history of the Supreme Court of this State. It's unexplainable, and in my opinion totally uncalled for."' 69 The court concluded
that the district attorney's comments were sanctionable because they
eroded essential public confidence in the justice system.7" Decisions
such as these (and there are several) are implicitly, if not explicitly,

grounded in the view that, as members of a regulated profession and
officers1 of the court, lawyers surrender some of their First Amendment
rights.

7

in an impartial adjudicatory process); Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Horak, 292 N.W.2d 129, 130 (Iowa
1980) ("To permit unfettered criticism regardless of the motive would tend to intimidate judges in
the performance of their duties and ...foster unwarranted criticism of our courts"); Kentucky Bar
Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Ky. 1980) (per curiam) (stating that a lawyer's comments
at a press conference, regarding a judge's unethical behavior, tends "to bring the bench and bar into
disrepute and... undermine public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process"); State ex rel.
Inman v. Brock, 622 S.W.2d 36, 52 (Tenn. 1981) (issuing an injunction against further suits by a
lawyer who challenged the legality of the composition of the Tennessee Supreme Court, because past
filings of papers made scandalous, impertinent, and demeaning allegations about judges).
67. In re Lacey, 283 N.W.2d 250, 251 (S.D. 1979) (quoting a 1976 article in The Republic,
entitled Lacey Continues to Supreme Court).
68. Id. at 252.
69. In re Raggio, 487 P.2d 499, 500 (Nev. 1971).
70. See id. at 500-01.
71. "Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances
might be constitutionally protected speech.' In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646-47 (1959) (Stewart,
J., concurring). In Sawyer, the lawyer subject to discipline spoke at a public meeting during a
pending trial, stating that "horrible" and "shocking" things go on at Smith Act trials and that
"[tihere's no such thing as a fair trial in a Smith Act case." Id. at 628-29. Justice Brennan, writing
for a four-member plurality to reverse the suspension, held that although the lawyer's statements
were an attack on the state of the law generally, they did not impugn the integrity of the trial judge
or reflect adversely on the trial. See id. at 636.
Justice Stewart concurred in the reversal solely on the basis that the evidence was
insufficient. See id. at 647. The quotation above suggests Justice Stewart's general agreement with
the dissent of Justice Frankfurter, who was joined by three other Justices, which stated that direct
attacks on the administration of justice and the integrity of a presiding judge were violations of
professional standards of conduct. See id. at 668-69; see also Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115
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Probably the best example of the contrary view is the Ninth
Circuit's recent decision in Standing Committee on Discipline v.
Yagman.72 In Yagman, the attorney in question had told a reporter that
a particular judge was "'drunk on the bench"' 73 and also wrote that he
was an anti-semite, 74 "'ignorant, dishonest, ill-tempered, and a bully,
and probably is one of the worst judges in the United States."' 75 The
court dismissed the charges, holding that criticisms of judges
may not be punished unless they are capable of being proved true or
false; statements of opinion are protected by the First Amendment
unless they "imply a false assertion of fact." Even statements that at
first blush appear to be factual are protected by the First Amendment
if they cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about
their target.76

In the same vein but closer to home is Justices of the Appellate Division,
First Department v. Erdmann," in which the New York Court of

Appeals concluded that a lawyer's vulgar and demeaning statement of
opinion regarding the judiciary-without reference to a particular judge
or pending case-fell outside the reach of professional discipline.7"

S. Ct. 2371, 2381 (1995) (holding that regulation of an attorney's speech, in the area of direct-mail
solicitation, was not a First Amendment violation); Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991)
(holding that a state may constitutionally limit a lawyer's speech if the expression is "substantially
likely to have a materially prejudicial effect" on an adjudicatory proceeding). But see Morris B.
Chapman, Criticism-A Lawyer's Duty or Downfall?, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 437, 449-50 (arguing in
favor of giving attorneys the identical First Amendment protections afforded laymen who criticize
the judiciary); Sandra M. Molley, Note, Restrictions on Attorney Criticism ofthe Judiciary:A Denial
of FirstAmendment Rights, 56 NoTRE DAME LAW. 489, 507 (1981) (arguing against disciplinary
rules restricting an attorney's right to criticize the judiciary).
72. 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995).
73. Id. at 1434.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 1434 n.4. The court was quoting from a letter written by Yagman, which was sent
in response to a request from PrenticeHall for information that could be included in the Lawyer's
Evaluation section of its Almanac of the FederalJudiciary.See id.at 1434.
76. Id. at 1438 (citations omitted). The New York Times Co. v. Sullivan "actual malice"
standard for statements about public officials imposes liability only on proof that the speaker acted
with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or
false. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). As the Ninth Circuit
applied this test, recklessness is determined objectively, by reference to the kind of investigation that
would be made by a "'reasonable attorney, considered in light of all his professional functions ... in
the same or similar circumstances."' Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437-38 (quoting United States District
Court v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 1993)).
77. 301 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1973).
78. The court held that "[w]ithout more, isolated instances of disrespect for the law, Judges
and courts expressed by vulgar and insulting words or other incivility, uttered, written, or committed
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I do not want to leave you with the impression that a lawyer can say

absolutely anything regarding a judge without risking professional
discipline.7 9 Last year, the Seventh Circuit, for example, upheld the
federal disbarment of an Illinois lawyer who criticized a judge, calling
him "'a crooked judge, who fills the pockets of his buddies.'"' 80 The
court noted that attorneys are not "entitled to excoriate judges in the
same way, and with the same lack of investigation, as persons may attack

political officeholders."'" Only months ago, the Supreme Court of Idaho
imposed a public reprimand where an attorney, speaking to the local
media, criticized a judge's decision as "motivated by political concerns."2 And in New York, the former Kings County District Attorney
was disciplined for publicly making false accusations about a judge and
demanding severe disciplinary measures be applied against him for
conduct during a criminal trial, when those accusations had been made
without even so much as consulting a transcript of the proceedings.8 3
The long and short of it is that, as a matter of ethics, judges are well
advised to avoid all public comment about current cases, leaving it to the

outside the precincts of a court are not subject to professional discipline." Id. at 427.
79. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Kleinfeld, 648 So. 2d 698, 701 (Fla. 1994) (suspending an
attorney-client for filing an affidavit accusing a judge of trying to intimidate her attorney); In re
Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 317, 325 (Minn. 1990) (holding that an attorney's accusation that two
judges had conspired to "fix" a case was an ethics violation, where the allegation was based on a
hearsay report of bits of a conversation heard at a holiday party); In re Golub, 597 N.Y.S.2d 370,
371 (App. Div. 1993) (disciplining an attorney for making allegations of judicial bias-he had
accused the judge of being in love with the defendant, actor William Hurt-in the wake of a
determination adverse to his client).
80. In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1854 (1996).
81. Id. at 487.
82. Idaho State Bar v. Topp, 925 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Idaho 1996). Additionally, under DR
1-102(A)(5) and Model Rule 8.4(d), courts have prohibited criticism made by a lawyer during the
pendency of a trial on the basis that the conduct prejudiced the administration of justice. See e.g.,
In re Friediand, 376 N.E.2d 1126 (Ind. 1978); In re Paulsrude, 248 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1976).
Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in Gentile v. StateBar,501 U.S. 1030 (1991), accepted
the proposition that attorney "speech that is substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial
effect" was subject to limitation. IL at 1076. Gentile, however, specifically dealt with a defense
lawyer's press conference held before trial, not with criticism of a judge or the judiciary.
83. See In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 31-32 (N.Y. 1991). But see United States v. Brown,
72 F.3d 25, 29 (5th Cir. 1995) (overturning the imposition of sanctions against an attorney who
challenged the impartiality of a trial judge, and holding Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct 8.2
to prohibit only "false or reckless statements questioning judicial qualifications or integrity (usually
allegations of dishonesty or corruption)"); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958,
961 (Okla. 1988) (dismissing a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney who called the judge a
racist after the trial concluded because the attorney had established "unrefuted evidence that he had
subjectively formed an opinion based upon experiences").
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bar to respond to criticism of them. Judges are, however, sitting ducks
for critics, even for lawyer-critics.
IV.

IMPROVING THE BALANCE

Have we struck a good balance-or, more accurately, a good
imbalance-between the fundamental value of respect for the law and the
fundamental right of lawyer-citizens to have their go at courts and
judges? I wonder.
On the one hand, I personally enjoy the swashbuckling, romantic
notion that judges are impervious "to the winds of public opinion
... [and that they are people] of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy
climate. " "4 Indeed, all through this year's bombardment, all through this
year's gridlock and shutdown in state and national government, the New
York courts have quietly and efficiently gone about their business of
deciding thousands of matters every single day.
On the other hand, as one of my Court of Appeals colleagues
recently observed, it feels "weak and pretty foolish" not to answer.8 5
And on the third hand (third hands are always the most worrisome), the
judicial "stiff upper lip" both emboldens the critics (who come to believe
their own hype) and leaves the public convinced that we are, after all, a
pretty shabby lot.
The plain truth is that bar leaders and bar associations today cannot
respond in equivalent fashion. Their responses just do not get the same
billing. And the heavy assault on the New York State courts, with no
rejoinder in kind, has unquestionably been costly. Based on a mere
handful of cases plucked from the millions we hear annually, the public
now has a false picture and diminished respect for a court system that
deserves much, much better.8 6
So I ask, should the professional ethics rules be reconsidered? If so,
which ones and how? Is a defamation standard for public figures really
the appropriate standard for lawyer criticism of judicial decisions? Are

84. Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947). Quoting Justice Douglas's famous lines from
this decision, Professor Monroe Freedman has argued that lawyers need to be more critical ofjudges,
not less. See Monroe Freedman, Flab or Fortitude:A Verdict on Judges, CONN. L. TarB., Mar. 11,
1996, at 22.
85. Joseph W. Bellacosa, Judging Cases Versus Courting Public Opinion, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 101, 102 (1997).
86. The New York State court system handles well over three million cases annually, of every
variety--from family law to criminal law, from shareholder actions to real estate disputes. See E.
LEO MiLONAS, SEvEEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF ADMINIs
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(1995).
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the existing rules sufficiently enforced not merely to exact but also to
encourage compliance? Should our Judicial Code be revised? Should
judges today be permitted, indeed encouraged, to enter the forbidden fray
and speak out in defense of their rulings, or should the Monday-morning
quarterbacking be left for others? What about the politician-lawyer-critics
who from time to time remind the public of their law training? Plainly,
the occasional practicing attorneys disciplined for criticizing judges do
not pose the same potential threat to judicial independence as the
politician-lawyer-critics, who have both enormous press access and
appointment powers.
One prerogative I especially enjoy as a Court of Appeals Judge is
that I can ask questions of lawyers that I do not have to answer myself
(and I have no intention of answering my own questions today). Instead,
I would like to pose, and close with, a few small steps that I think would
be helpful. Before proceeding with my suggestions, however, I should
say outright what I hope is implicit: though I strongly doubt that the
answer lies in professional discipline, I think the balance most definitely
does need adjustment. Recent events have amply proved this. I will begin
with what judges can do to rebalance the system.
A.

Judges as Communicators

When it comes to public discussion of current decisions, I cannot
see judges offering David Letterman the top ten explanations of a
controversial new decision, or answering callers about a case on Larry
King Live, or facing off with the Governor about a ruling on Nightline.
Sitting judges are not media stars nor are they Monday-morning
87
quarterbacks.
In one important respect, however, judges can do more in the way
of communication about their decisions. Judges speak through their
rulings, and they should always try to speak fully, clearly, and comprehensibly. Judicial decisions, and the basis for them, should be accessible
in every sense. They should be readily obtainable and as understandable
as legal material can be. Decisions that are unnecessarily difficult to
follow--subsegmented, cross-referenced, filled with foreign phrases and

87. See In re Broadbelt, 683 A.2d 543, 548 (N.J. 1996) (holding that a judge's regular
appearances on Court TV and Geraldo Live, in which he commented on cases pending in other
jurisdictions, violated the state's Code of Judicial Conduct).
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excessive footnotes--are not models of scholarship or any other
virtue.8 At the other extreme, and equally undesirable, are seemingly
arbitrary pronouncements of result.
Of course there are limitations. Obviously not every decision calls
for elaborate explanation. Time is another major limitation: many judges
have dockets of hundreds of cases. Then too, no one should expect
popular prose about the legal issues that come before us. It takes work
to decide a case and compose a decision; it takes work to analyze and
understand one. The point is simply that, whenever possible, decisions
should be written or spoken so that "the reasonable critic'--meaning the
person who spends the time and effort serious legal matters deserve
before forming an opinion-can make sense of them.
Which leads me to the lawyer-critics, who, by virtue of their
training and license, have a special responsibility to study judicial
decisions before criticizing them.
B.

Responsible Criticism by Lawyers

Criticism is useful and important for every institution, including the
courts, but only so long as it is responsible criticism. In the words of
Judge Learned Hand: "Let [judges] be severely brought to book, when
they go wrong, but by those who will take the trouble to understand."8 9
Irresponsible criticism is destructive particularly for the Third Branch
because judges for the most part cannot, do not, and positively should
not engage in shouting matches with critics.
What then is responsible criticism? Responsible criticism of a
decision requires, as an absolute minimum, that the critic, especially the
lawyer-critic, study the decision before commenting on it. This requires
attention not only to the result, or the first paragraph, or the dispositive
sentence, or someone else's opinion, but to the entire decision. A premise
of composing judicial decisions comprehensibly is that they will be
studied and some effort will be made to understand them.
Additionally, it is not too much to ask that before expressing a view,
the critic should know something about the law underlying the decision.
If decisions have absolutely no basis in law, that is itself a respectable

88. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER FAMING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL

PROFESSION 347 (1993) (lamenting on the demise of the model opinion, which has become "the long
and excessively footnoted decision that moves, in a stiffly mechanical way.).
89. Learned Hand, How FarIs a JudgeFree in Rendering a Decision? (1935), reprinted in
THE SPmRT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 103, 110 (Irving Dilliard ed.,
3d ed. 1960).
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criticism. But if decisions are grounded on statutes or the Constitution or
court precedents (as is much more likely), knowing the law involved is
an essential part of every responsible critic's evaluation.
I think much of the recent judge-bashing has not been responsible
criticism. In many instances I doubt that the critic knew much more than
the case result. Even more likely is the case where the critic was simply
told someone else's opinion of the result before commenting publicly. In
several recent headline assaults, for example, the Court of Appeals was
attacked as a citadel of technicality where it was applying requirements
of existing statutes rather than its own notions of justice." No one
would have known that from press releases and press reports. A
responsible critic, and consequently an informed public, should know that
statutes, which are enacted by the legislature and signed into law by the
executive, confine a court's discretion and limit the possible outcomes in
a case. Courts are not free to ignore or disregard the words of statutes.
If in actual application a particular statute leads to results the
legislature and executive find undesirable, those branches of government-the policymakers--can rewrite the statutes. It is not insulting to
the courts when lawmakers amend statutes to make clear what they
intend,9 1 and there is no need to insult courts in order to get the
legislature's attention. Indeed, the court system itself often advocates
reform of a statute after it has been tested by the crucible of real-life
facts.
Moreover, an informed public should know that trial court decisions
are subject to appeal and that reversal of a conviction does not automatically put a dangerous criminal out on the street, but almost invariably

90. See, e.g., People v. Page, 665 N.E.2d 1041 (N.Y. 1996) (applying N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 270.35 (McKinney 1993); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2); People v. Damiano, 663 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y.

1996) (applying N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.20(2) (McKinney 1993)); People v. Bolden, 613
N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1993) (applying N.Y. CRM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(4)(c) (McKinney 1992)); People

v. Keindl, 502 N.E.2d 577 (N.Y. 1986) (applying N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 200.50(6) (McKinney
1993)).
91. The New York legislature recently rewrote several criminal statutes. See N.Y. CRiM. PROC.
LAW § 270.35 (McKinney 1993) (dealing with substitution of an alternate juror for a regular juror);
iU. § 310.20 (pertaining to information that may be included on a verdict sheet provided to a deliberating jury); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 3030(4)(c) (McKinney 1992) (dealing with a defendant's right
to a speedy trial and the state's obligation to locate an absent or unavailable defendant). For cases
applying these statutes, see Page, 665 N.E.2d at 1041 (§ 270.35); Damiano, 663 N.E.2d at 607
(§ 310.20); People v. Spivey, 615 N.E.2d 961 (N.Y. 1993) (same); and Bolden, 613 N.E.2d at 145

(§ 30.30(4)(c)).
The fact that these statutes were substantially rewritten, rather than resulting from court
decisions being "overruled," is made amply clear by a side-by-side comparison of the original and

the new laws.
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results in a new trial. Facts like these deaden the soundbite, but fair is
fair-both to the judiciary and to the public.
All of which points me to my last subject: the public.
C. Educating the Public
I have no delusion that there is any quick fix. There is simply too
much entertainment value, too much political capital in the cynical
soundbite uttered alongside crime victims and their families. In addition
to concentrating on immediate solutions, I would pose as a final longterm solution a comprehensive program of citizen education in the law.
In 1906, Roscoe Pound, later Dean of the Harvard Law School,
observed that a cause of the dissatisfaction with the administration of
justice was the "public ignorance of the real workings of courts due to
ignorant and sensational reports in the press." 2 A full ninety years later,
it is sad to say, we are no better off. If anything, modem technology has
greatly magnified the problem.
We live in a time when the public is saturated in the language and
superficial trappings of the law. Terms like double jeopardy, presumed
innocent, and reasonable doubt have become common parlance, by now
probably even designer perfumes. Every day the media is filled with
stories about the law. Yet, as a society we do little to educate the public
about how the legal system really works. There is virtually no systematic
teaching about the courts in the schools. We, the justice system insiders,
have left it entirely to the media to educate the public in this area, which
surely has not advantaged courts or lawyers, whose good works are
rarely publicized. As recent history overwhelmingly has proved, the
media does not see itself as responsible for educating the public,
preferring rather to focus on our occasional foibles and fumbles.
Most people have never even met a judge---4hey have no human
face to associate with the terrible things they now read of us. Judges tend
to spend their nonworking time with one another or with lawyers.
Speeches at law gatherings are most often by lawyers or judges, and
extrajudicial writings are usually confined to law audiences and law
reviews, which, regrettably, even lawyers do not read. Is it any wonder
that more than half the public could name the Three Stooges, but not a

92. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
Address at the Convention of the American Bar Association, (Aug. 26, 1906), in 35 F.R.D. 273, 289

(1964).
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single Supreme Court Justice? 93

Some of the questions I

am

asked-even by reporters-are frightening because they reveal such
unfamiliarity with what we do.
I think the time has come for justice system insiders to take a much
more aggressive role in the area of public relations, especially public
education. Essentially, we need to find ways to work with the media,
with the public at large, and with the school population. I will touch very
briefly on each.
First, I know the media has numerous complaints about us; we
surely have a long list of dissatisfactions with them. But I am convinced

that, by focusing serious attention on one another's problems in joint
programs, we can each broaden our perspective to mutual advantage.94
Second, that same creativity and ingenuity will be needed to design
educational programs for the public; not discussion of particular current
cases but more generalized explanations about who we are, what we do,
and how we do it.9 We need to go into the communities, and we need
to bring the public into the courts.96 I know that a great deal already is

done by judges and lawyers. Plainly, we must do more.
Finally, we need even more outreach to the school population, again

already a subject many lawyers and judges are actively pursuing. 97 We
93. See Richard Morin, A Nation of Stooges, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1995, at C5.
94. An example of such partnership is the New York Fair Trial Free Press Conference,
established 27 years ago to provide a forum for judges, lawyers, journalists, and law enforcement
officials to discuss fair trial/free press issues. See Frank P. Trotta, Jr., The New York Tunes Is on
Hold and Mike Wallace Is Herefrom 60 Minutes, reprintedin LAW PRACrICE MANAGEMENT FOR
THE SOLO AND SMALL OFFICE PRACITIIONER 1990, at 151,154 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 532, 1990).
95. For example, New York State's Unified Court System, through its Speakers Bureau, has
arranged for judges of the supreme court to speak before their respective community boards on the
role of judges and the judiciary. The program has generated much interest, with community boards
already requesting return engagements.
96. In 1993, New York created three pilot Judicial Advisory Councils--in Queens and Nassau
Counties, and upstate New York-composed of local community leaders, citizen group representatives, local business leaders, academics, judges, and lawyers, which are designed to foster a closer
working relationship between the courts and the communities they serve. New York's efforts were
cited as examples for the future by the National Courts and Community Advisory Committee. See
NATIONAL COURTs AND COMMUNITY ADvIsORY COMM., CITzENs AND THEIR COURTS: BUILDING
A PUBLIC CONSTITUENCY (1995). New Jersey also won accolades for its citizen volunteer program,
which helps communicate understanding of the judicial system into the greater community. See i&.
97. See, e.g., NEw YORK STATE BAR ASS'N, LAW, YOUTH & CrmENSm: A STATEWIDE
LAW-RELATED EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM (1996). The New York State Bar Association, together with
the New York State Education Department, formed a partnership to provide training programs,
publications for students and educators, a mock trial tournament involving over 550 school districts,
and classroom presentations by attorneys concerning the law and the legal system.
Similarly, in Tennessee, a program for educating high school students provides an in-depth
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have missed opportunities to educate the present generation, but
hopefully we can do better with the next one. Systematic education about
the justice system, so much a part of life today, could not only result in
a better informed citizenry, but also could promote more law-abiding
conduct and encourage alternatives to violence.
V.

CONCLUSION

As a judge, I often marvel at the endless proliferation of novel legal
issues: how is it that there continue to be so many questions courts have
not already resolved? I feel much the same as I see long-simmering
problems suddenly sweep society. A few years ago it was sexual
harassment; more recently domestic violence and child abuse issues have
come to the forefront. A person or an event kindles a blaze of media
interest that makes its way from the front pages to the law reviews.
Hopefully in the progression there are constructive stops along the way
and something good emerges.
Whatever precisely ignited current interest, the subject of criticism
of courts-politicizing the judiciary-has earned its spot among highprofile issues of the day. Speeches, articles, and forums on the subject of
judicial independence suddenly are everywhere. Presently talking past
each other are advocates for and against "criticism" when that is not the
issue at all. No one can seriously object to criticism. It is its dramatically
changed quality that is so troubling, and so threatening to the independence of the courts. Perhaps one of the constructive things that will
emerge is a shared understanding of what is meant by responsible (and
conversely irresponsible) criticism of judicial decisions, especially by
lawyers. And as the ethics issues are weighed and settled, I hope that
together we can embark on a positive program to make the justice system
better appreciated and better understood by the people it serves.

view of the Tennessee Supreme Court with students attending a session of oral arguments at the
court, meeting with the judges at lunch, and meeting at the end of the day for a "debriefimg" with
the attorneys who argued the cases. Volunteer lawyers and judges also go to the schools before
argument day to educate both teachers and students about the judicial process. See NATIONAL ASS'N
FOR COURT MANAGEMENT, DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAMS FOR
COURTS 7 (1996).
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